

米軍占領下における沖縄 —1945年から1952年の混乱状況と原因を検証する—

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Okinawa under US Occupation The Chaotic Situation of Okinawa from 1945 to 1952: How was it and Why was it?

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要 旨

本論の研究目的は戦後の米軍の占領が沖縄の社会及び人々に与えた影響を分析・考察することであり、リサーチ・クエスチョンは「ミニッツ布告発令の1945年からサンフランシスコ講和条約発効の1952年にかけての米軍占領下の沖縄の混乱状況はどのようなものであったのか、又、その原因は何であったのか？」である。1章で本論の背景として、又、混乱状況を比較判断する材料として新聞報道に見る沖縄の現況を捉え、その現況の起源として、又、本論のリサーチ・クエスチョンの1つである混乱の原因に間接的に答えるものとして2章で天皇メッセージを含めた米軍統治に至るまでの国内外の政治状況を概観する。3章ではタイムズ特派員フランク・ギブニーの記事とロディ・ニュース・センチネル紙の記事により「忘れられた島」とされた戦後の沖縄社会の混乱状況を示す。4章では前章で提示された混乱の主な原因について検証し、5章でそのような状況が沖縄の人々の占領者、米国に対する印象をどのように変えていったかを分析、6章をまとめとする。1945年から1952年までの米軍占領下の沖縄の混乱状況とその原因を米国の雑誌や新聞記事、米軍関連事件、事故とそれに関する米国、沖縄両者の報告書及び資料等をもとに検証するものである。検証過程において、ギブニー以前に「忘れられた島」という表現で報道したロディ・ニュース・センチネル紙の記事、及び伊江島爆発事故における米軍報告書の提示は本論において初めて為されたものであり、新資料として提示される価値は大きい。又、本研究は米国の占領政策とその占領下にあった沖縄を例に、占領者の政策に影響される被占領地域の社会状況や人々に焦点が当てられていることにその意義をもつものとする。

キーワード: 米軍占領下の沖縄, 米国の政策不在, 忘れられた島, 米軍関連の事件・事故, 沖縄の人々の米国観

Abstract

This paper's aim is to analyze the influences of the US military occupation of Okinawa on the society and people of post-war Okinawa. The research question is "How was the chaotic situation in Okinawa from 1945 to 1952 and what were its Causes?" The first chapter seizes the present situation in Okinawa as a backdrop for the paper and as a source for understanding the past chaotic situation. The second chapter examines how the international and domestic political situation after World War II led to the US occupation of Okinawa. The third chapter cites two articles on the "Forgotten Island" — Frank Gibney's article and another that appeared in the *Lodi News Sentinel*—to show the situation of chaos in post-war Okinawa. The fourth chapter examines the causes of the chaotic situation during that period, and the fifth chapter traces

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the people's sentiment toward the US military as the result of the chaotic situation. The paper cites never before examined materials which are important to help focus on the society and the sentiment of the occupied. The research has its significance in painting a portrait of the occupied and its society influenced by the occupier.

Keywords: Okinawa under US military occupation, non-existence of US policy, Forgotten Island, US military accidents, people's sentiment toward the U.S.

0. Introduction

It was March, the 26th, 1945 when the Nimitz ordinance⁽¹⁾ was issued and the US military governance seized all the power that the Japanese governance had at the end of the Okinawan War. It was nearly six months later than the issue of Nimitz Ordinance that the Potsdam Declaration was accepted by Japan on August the 14th, 1945. In 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect. Regarding the situation of Okinawa around the time of 1949, although authors Miyazato Seigen (Miyazato, 1986, pp.56-59.) and Matuda Yoneo (Matuda, 1998, pp.29-32) referred to Frank Gibney's article "Forgotten Island," printed in *TIME* magazine, their comments on the article were quite limited. They did not describe in detail the chaotic situation that Gibney had written about, nor did they mention its causes.

Regarding the duration of the chaos described in "Forgotten Island," Miyazato set the period between 1945, when the Okinawan war ended, and July 1948, when RyCom (Ryukyu Command headquarters) became independent from Phil-RyCom (Philippines and Ryukyu Command headquarters) and was put under the direct control of GHQ (the general headquarters) in Tokyo. Matuda wrote that during the period in which US military government rule was changed to US civil administration office rule, no particular policy was taken toward Okinawa, making it a "forgotten island," citing the name of Gibney's article. In other words, Matuda meant that the chaos continued from March 26, 1945, when the US military landed on Okinawa, to Dec. 25, 1950, when the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) was established. However, I set the period of no policy toward Okinawa even longer —from March 26, 1945, to April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, since it was the time that Okinawa was officially separated

from Mainland Japan and the political position of Okinawa was determined.

Given the lack of detail and explanation in the literature, the purpose of this paper is to examine more thoroughly the chaotic situation of Okinawa from 1945 to 1952 and the causes of the chaotic situation. Therefore, the research question guiding this paper is how was the situation under the US military occupation from the year of 1945 when the Nimitz ordinance was issued to the year of 1952 after effectuation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and what caused it. In order to answer this research question, I surveyed the primary sources, such as official documents or minutes of committees, as well as secondary sources of materials dealing with Okinawa under US occupation.

1. Present Okinawa

To provide important background, this paper begins with a description of the present situation of Okinawa, more specifically, how the presence of US military bases affects the life of Okinawans at present. I consider this background information is important in that the present situation can be compared with the situation of chaos, which is the focus of this paper. Furthermore, this section offers a better understanding of the focused chaotic situation. Forty years have passed since Okinawa was reversed to Japan in 1972. Just taking a look at the daily newspapers of Okinawa for a week or so presents a clear picture of the present situation of Okinawa, still affected by the presence of the US military. The following are brief summaries of the newspaper articles with their titles. The order of presentation of these articles is as follows: first, by the date of the paper (old to new) and, then, by the size of the article (large to small).

Aug.14 (Tuesday)

- ①Okinawa Kokusai University speaks against the Osprey deployment at the 8th anniversary of the helicopter crash on the campus.
- ②Two men start no-time limit hunger strike
Two men start a no-time limit hunger strike tomorrow at Camp Zukeran against the deployment of Osprey.
- ③US military F22 emergency landing
- ④US amphibian tanks destroyed the curb of an ordinary national road of Ginoza village

Aug. 17th (Friday)

- ①Corals off Ginoza were damaged
Corals were found broken and damaged in fifty places between the range of 4 meters in width and 100 meters in length near the training area of US military camp Shuwab in Ginoza village. The head of the village fishermen's cooperative regards it the result of running of US amphibian tanks.
- ②Noise in Kadena town counts over 100 decibels 6 times a day
The noise issued from US Kadena air base recorded over 100 decibels 6 times a day and it was found that the noise environment in Kadena town has gotten worse recently.
- ③Ginoza village protests
On the 11th, when the US military's amphibian tanks were crossing the national road used by citizens, soldiers with guns were training, pointing their guns to the road. The head of the village, Mr. Higashi, protested to the Okinawa branch of the Japanese defense ministry saying, "It's a place of living for citizens and such training scares the people. Please request the US military not to have such an armed training in the village coming out of the military base."

Aug. 19th (Sunday)

- ①Six defects were found in Osprey
A US specialist, a former head of assayers in IDA (Institute of Defense Analysis) who are conversant on the procedure of Osprey development clarified that the Osprey has six defects including becoming unable to be controlled. He says that the Pentagon grasps the problems but since they originate in the Osprey's structure itself, there is no way to solve the problems. He also points out that since it needs more complicated and specialized skills compared to other types of airplanes, a small pilot error will

easily lead to a big accident.

- ②A marine was arrested on suspicion of sexual assault
The Naha police arrested a marine on the 18th on suspicion of sexual assault. He is a corporal belonging to Camp Butler. A woman injured on the head when she was hit and dragged to a back alley by the suspect. She was walking on the street in Naha.

Aug. 22nd (Wednesday)

- ① Military's climate encourages sex offenses
A military sergeant who had been stationed in Okinawa testified that the military has a climate that encourages soldiers to commit sex offenses.
- ②Female groups request an apology
As for the arrest of a US Marine on suspicion of sexual assault, the Okinawa prefectural female groups network (Okinawa ken jyosei danntai rennraku kyogikai) requested a calling for the apology to the victim and a withdrawal of US military base from Okinawa.
- ③Helipad construction at Takae resumes
Helipad relocation construction resumed in the early morning on the 21st at Takae in Higashi village. According to the residents against the construction, the construction workers started land surveying on the morning of the 15th and the residents who have been taking actions against the construction have increased their state of alertness.
- ④Japan Peace Committee calls for the stop of construction and return of the training ground

Aug. 23rd (Thursday)

- ①Agent Orange—Okinawa also should raise its voice
An American woman (39) who has congenital malformation in her limbs due to her father's experience with Agent Orange during the Vietnam War presented a lecture at Okinawa University. There are many testimonies of using, stocking, and burying Agent Orange by US soldiers stationed in Okinawa during Vietnam War. The US military still denies the existence of Agent Orange in Okinawa during the war.
- ②Noise over 102 decibels was recorded in Kadena town
The town's countermeasures committee for the military base issue conducted the visual inspection at Kadena on the 22nd and recognized F-18 jetfighters at 15:45 and A18 fighters at 19:00 taking

off and landing including the emergency landing at 20:00. Every time the noise reached 102.4 decibels at its highest. The head of the committee said that the number of fighters from other bases is increasing and the roaring from the base gets worse and worse.”

As can be seen in the news of the daily papers for a week or so described above, the problems caused by the presence of US military bases, such as noise pollution, environmental destruction and crimes, symbolize the present situation that Okinawa has to face. These problems can be summarized as environmental destruction, (noise pollution, land pollution, the destruction of nature, etc.), crimes by US soldiers (sexual offense, robbery, murder) and accidents (traffic accidents and airplane crash) and others such as injuries from the rifle drills. Even though the present lives of the Okinawan people are still affected by the problems brought by the US military presence, the situation of Okinawa around the time when Gibney called it the “Forgotten Island” was bad enough to be called chaos.

Before examining that situation, I review the US military occupation of Okinawa and its presence in Okinawa for such a long time from the historical point of view. It is important to have the historical knowledge in order to acknowledge the origin of the problem and the background knowledge to understand the focused problem. Moreover, this paper recognizes this part as one of the answers to the question “Why was it chaos?” including the direct answer shown in chapter 4 in this paper.

2. US occupation of Okinawa

2-1. How was it started?

What was the origin of the Okinawan problems mentioned above in the first chapter? Thomas J McCormick (1992) writes that the US foreign diplomacy using the atomic bomb succeeded in making European countries accept the US international hegemony, and in place of Britain, which was made impoverished by the war, the United States was allowed to start exercising its dominant power in the world by providing material aid and security through the World Bank and IMF (International Monetary Fund) from 1945 to

1946. However, there existed a conflict between the Military and the Department of State to decide the US diplomacy after the war in 1946.⁽²⁾ That conflict was reflected in dealing with post-war Okinawa. Miyazato points out that until the end of 1944, the US military did not put strategic importance on Okinawa. He says it was the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Marshal, who first pointed out in his letter to President Harry Truman the importance of Okinawa in the US’s strategy in the East after the war. (Miyazato,1986,p.34) The US military strengthened its opinion on Ryukyus and confronted the Department of State in 1946. Miyazato writes that the US military submitted its plan to the SWNCC (States, War, Navy, Coordination Committee) in January 1946. According to this plan, the trusteeship treaty should have two conditions— one is to ensure the US military base in Ryukyu, and second is its ruler should be America. The document submitted to the SWNCC by the Department of State in June 1946 states that 1) possessing even a part of Ryukyus will oppose the principle of non-expansion of territory; 2) the occupation of Ryukyus will be a financial burden and this would mean that the US governs nearly a million people quite different from American people in culture and appearance; and 3) building a permanent base will invite serious reaction internationally (e.g., China, as well as the USSR, would take it as a serious threat.) Other countries also considered that occupying Okinawa as a military base exceeded America’s justified political and regional benefit. After political and diplomatic consideration, Okinawa should be regarded as a small island demilitarized and returned. Miyazato points out this view of the Department of State had its traditional stand point and the concept of cold war had not yet penetrated; also, its policy toward Japan was based on the principle of international harmony. (Miyazato,1986,pp.47~48) The concept of the military won over that of the Department of State. Here, it should be remembered that C.W.Mills (1969) points out that the military man’s political role in deciding political and economic matters has increased after the war and diplomatic policy and international relationship have been greatly affected by their military abstract argument. He says that when the elite started to accept the military way to view the world, the people whom we thought

professional diplomats lost their effective speaking abilities in his work “power elite.” He cites the peace agreement with Japan as its example.

As for the issue of post-war Okinawa, Shindo explains that from the end of November 1944 to January 1945, the Department of State concluded that regarding the Ryukyu Islands and Chishima Islands, Minami Chishima should be considered Japanese territory but Naka Chishima and Kita Chishima should be considered USSR’s. Ryukyu should belong to Japan; in case China insisted its right to possess or the residents want to change its sovereignty, an international institution should be set up to decide. (Shindo,1979) However, in February 1945, when the Yalta agreement was concluded, the US military began to insist that Ryukyu be used as a US military base. It was June 1945 that the battle of Okinawa ended with Commander Ushijima’s suicide and the US military’s opinion seemed to be strengthened with the end of the war. Douglas Lamis points out that it was the opinion of the US military that Okinawa was a booty seized through the severe battle of Okinawa with large loss of life of military personnel. (2010)

Miyazato attaches great importance to the fact that Japan surrendered after the end of the battle of Okinawa without a land battle in mainland Japan by quoting the remark of former staff of the Department of State, Owen Zaheren: “If Japan had surrendered in spring of 1945, there would have been no separation of Okinawa from Japan. Once the military government was established there, and several months passed, it was hard to change this situation and nobody did.” The military did not see the strategic importance of Okinawa at the end of 1944. It was after the end of the battle of Okinawa that the US military started to stress Okinawa’s strategic importance. Four months after the end of the battle, the US military decided to make Okinawa a major military base which the US should have control over.

There was a possibility that Japan ended the war earlier to save the Emperor system. Sashida Tsutomu points out that, on Feb. 14, 1945, one of the Emperor’s aids, Fumimaro Konoe, advised the Emperor by saying “Considering the present situation, Japan’s defeat cannot be avoidable. It’s better to hasten the peace negotiation in order to

preserve the Emperor system.” The Emperor’s reply was “After one more military achievement” and so the war continued (Sashida, 1998, p.23). Sashida expects that if the Emperor had decided to surrender at that time, there would have been no Battle of Okinawa (U.S. army landed on Okinawa in April 1, 1945), in which 200,000 Okinawan people were sacrificed, and there would have been no Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters afterwards. However, the Japanese army called the strategy of the Battle of Okinawa as “sacrificed stone strategy,”⁽³⁾ in which Okinawa was seen as something which should be sacrificed for the defense of the Japanese mainland. I doubt if there was a chance that Japan could have surrendered before the Battle of Okinawa since Okinawa was a stone to make a sacrifice for the defense of mainland Japan from the start.

On the stage of history, the strong are the main characters who often appear; therefore, it is hard to see the weak. It was the same with Okinawa, the weak: Its existence was ignored and its destiny was decided by the strong. Masaaki Gabe (1996) writes that in studying the post-war history of Okinawa, he found that most of the important decisions on Okinawa’s future had been decided at Tokyo and Washington without Okinawa and what they decided was just reported to Okinawa later on (p.228). Okinawa was a sacrifice stone during the war and it was again sacrificed at the end of the war by being provided as the territory occupied by the US military. However, it was not known that there also existed a clarified intention of the Japanese side until Shindo Eiichi (1979) found the Emperor message.

2-2. How was it finalized -Emperor message-

Regarding the Emperor message, Ryukyu Shinpo on April 11, 1979, reported that it was found by Shindo Eiichi, among US-Japan related materials at the U.S. National Archive in Washington. Shindo reported it in his paper entitled “Separated territories-Okinawa, Chishima and Anpo (US-Japan security treaty)” in the journal *Sekai* issued in April 1979. The message was read in the letter sent to General MacArthur Douglas by William Sebald, a Counselor of Mission. Terasaki Hidenari, a purveyor to the Imperial Household, called on Sebald and passed along a message from the Emperor in Sep.1947.⁽⁴⁾

The gist of the Emperor message above can be explained as follows: 1) The Emperor wanted the United States to continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of Ryukyus. 2) The occupation of Okinawa and other islands should be based upon the fiction of a long-term lease of 25 to 50 years or more with sovereignty retained in Japan. 3) He considers that the occupation of Okinawa would benefit the United States and it would protect Japan. 4) Acquisition of “military base rights” of Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus should be by bilateral treaty between the United States and Japan rather than from part of the Allied peace treaty with Japan.

Shindo (1979) points out the backdrop that even at a time of war, aides of the Emperor were afraid of communization of Japan and they appealed to GHQ about the threat of USSR and communism through their political group including key figures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan under US occupation. Furthermore, at the time, Australia and USSR had been requesting that the Emperor be judged as a war criminal in the Far East Military Court, and the issue that the Emperor was a war criminal or not was still in debate.

Articles of Uruma Shimpo, the newspaper in Okinawa at the time, reported on the issue as follows: The paper of Nov. 13th in 1945 reported that the “Japanese Communist Party puts the Emperor as the war criminal at the top of its war criminal list” under the title of “The Emperor is the top war criminal.” As reported in the paper of Dec. 5th in 1945, “The issue of the Emperor, if he is a war criminal or not, is in a debate in China.” Prior to that, the paper of Dec. 4th had reported the news from Washington: “Regarding 59 Japanese war criminals whom General of the Army Douglas MacArthur listed, the new view that the Emperor should be included has been debated in Washington. There is a possibility that the Emperor should be prosecuted as a criminal of the aggressive war. In that case, in what grade he should be classified is now debated.” Also, the paper of Dec. 5th reported, “A prosecutor of war criminal trial in open court announced that whether the Emperor be a war criminal or not would be decided in Tokyo.”

Ota Masahide states that the Emperor’s message was sent in order to seek not only his own security

but Japan’s as well because the treatment of the Emperor as a war criminal was still in debate at the time. (Ota, 2010) He points out that is why Seabald said “a hope which undoubtedly is largely based upon self-interest,” reflecting on such a difficult situation of the Emperor. Regarding this point, Sashida Tsutomu (1998) points out another factor of the democratic movement that existed at that time: Even though the Emperor’s message mentions the menace of “the growth of rightist and leftist groups which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan,” what the Emperor and his aides were really afraid of was the collapse of the Emperor system by the movement of democratization, which was showing a surge. It is clear that Seabald knew the Emperor’s intention lay in the preservation of the Emperor system, escaping from being judged as a war criminal and expressed it as “self-interest” in his memorandum.

Shindo maintains that the importance of the Emperor’s message was in its influence on the policy makers of America to decide the future of Okinawa. He says the Emperor’s message justified the position of the GHQ, which planned Okinawa’s perpetuation as a US military base as well as that of the policy planning department, which insisted on a one-side peace without the USSR—not an overall peace. Ota (2010) proves this by citing the letter of advice sent by George Kennan to U. Robett, an Under Secretary of State on the 15th of October 1947, shortly after the Emperor’s message was issued. It was stated in the letter that the policy planning department gave heed to the fact that the Japanese Emperor suggested that Okinawa and other islands be occupied by the U.S. military through the medium of a long-term lease---25 to 50 years or more---with sovereignty retained in Japan. This is followed by the suggestion that it should be discussed as an alternative proposal of strategic trusteeship at that time. Ota asserts that the Emperor’s message led to Article 3 in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. (Ota,2010,p p.68~70) It can be said that the destiny of Okinawa was decided by both the U.S. and the Japanese government. It is natural to view that Japan sacrificed Okinawa two times—once as a sacrifice to protect mainland Japan from the attack of the U.S. in World War II and second as a sacrifice to secure the position of the Emperor and Japan.

Ryukyu Shimpo (1979) concludes its article on the Emperor's message as follows: "As for the move of the U.S. dealing with Okinawa around the time of the Peace treaty with Japan, the Japanese people have been well informed, but the existence of the message from the Emperor has not been known; since now it was found, it will create a stir." However, the Japanese media remained quiet about it. By 1979, only seven years after its reversion to Japan, Okinawa had become a forgotten island again. It also showed that Japan tended to ignore anything that could tarnish the image of the Emperor. The Emperor, the symbol of Japan, was not just a symbol but an existence that should not be disgraced. The existence that cannot be criticized by anyone has the destiny to be like the Emperor in "The Emperor's New Clothes" and it means Japan also cannot review what it did in the past war under the appeal of "Let's die for the emperor!"

3. Okinawa under US occupation described by Americans

3-1. *Lodi News Sentinel's* "Forgotten Island"

Gibney's article, "Forgotten Island" (Nov. 28, 1949) is well known to the people who have studied occupied Okinawa; however, I found that Gibney was not the first to use the phrase. Before the *TIME* article of Frank Gibney's "Okinawa-Forgotten Island," the *Lodi News Sentinel* (Aug.11, 1947) had already referred to Okinawa as the "forgotten island" and expressed concern about the absence of clarification of the status of the island. Since the article has not been taken up by any researcher as a source to describe the chaotic situation of Okinawa so far, as an article in which the phrase of "forgotten island" was used before Gibney's article in "Time," it is meaningful to give some space for the article. The following is its article entitled "Island Unbuilt Two Years After Capture of U.S."

Naha Okinawa (UP) -Two years after the conquest of the island by the United States in one of the bloodiest campaigns of the Pacific War, much of southern Okinawa still has the appearance of a battlefield. The city of Naha, once a thriving port of 65,000 persons with a prosperous foreign trade, is simply a mass of ruins on either side of a military highway which

connects U.S. Army installations on the island. A few Japanese soldiers are believed to be still at large in the mountains north and Japanese land mines and booby traps still abound and occasionally kill both Americans and Okinawans who venture into old tombs, the debris of buildings and other dangerous areas: Okinawa, indeed, is a symbol of the indecision of the United States in working out the details of its Far Eastern policy. 24 months gone by organized Japanese resistance on the island ended on June 21, 1945, after 82 days of the fiercest kind of fighting in which 15,000 Americans including such figures as Lieut. Gen. Simon Buckner, commander of the U.S. 10th Army and Ernie Pyle, war correspondent, lost their lives and some 20,000 more were wounded. 24 months later, not a single major building on the island has been built. American troops are living in temporary shelters. Hundreds of thousands of natives are living in shacks not fit for human habitation. They are being fed, in part, American food which has to be imported because of a lack of fertilizer and fishing equipment. Ships are being unloaded in rudimentary fashion because of delay in rebuilding the port.

Forgotten Island

Okinawa is one of the forgotten islands of the post-war period, a leading American here told this correspondent. "When an occasional brass flies through here from Washington en route to Tokyo or Shanghai, he is likely to agree that Okinawa is of vital strategic importance to the United States but, so far as we can find out, he does nothing about it." U.S. military leaders are not inclined to talk for publication, but it is obvious that they hope desperately for early clarification of the status of the island and announcement of a long-term American program. The local commanders are doing what they can, but that is little because of a lack of funds and authorization. The best kept spots on the island, so far as this correspondent could see in a hasty tour, are the five big military cemeteries in which the war dead are buried. (underlined by Yonaha)

Here in this article, the irritation and anger of

the military personnel toward the government which had no policy for Okinawa can be read. Underlined part was a cause of the chaos: "indecision of the United States in working out the details of its Far Eastern policy." The indecision of the United States continued until the San Francisco Peace Treaty was issued. The view was shared among the officers of the US military government in Okinawa that it was only after the San Francisco Peace Treaty when Okinawa's territorial jurisdiction was decided. The comment to prove this can be found in the minutes of the meeting of the heads of the 12 major communities held under the presidency of the US military government on Oct. 23rd in 1945. To the question of the head of Taira, "Aren't you going to set up the central organization?" , the officer of the US military government answered, "For a while, there is no central organization. It's after Okinawa's political position is decided at the Peace Conference. We cannot set up the government; however, military government can exist." (Okinawa Prefectural board of education, 1986, p.119) The head of Taira's "central organization" seems to have meant Okinawan government by the Okinawan people.

3-2. Frank Gibney's Forgotten Island

It was Nov. 28, 1949, that the *Time* correspondent Frank Gibney (1949) reported that Okinawa was a forgotten island with two pictures: one, the photo entitled "Okinawa Bullfight" in a library, hope and another, photo of Major General Sheetz entitled "After Gloria, a shake-up." ("Foreign News" p.24 ~ 27) Below, the author quotes excerpts from the article seized at OPA. (Okinawa Prefecture Archives)

On Okinawa, where more than four years ago U.S. arms won a famous and a costly victory (80,000 dead & wounded), General Douglas MacArthur's Pacific command has carried on a postwar occupation without much notice from the outside world. *TIME* correspondent Frank Gibney toured the all-but-forgotten island, cabled:

(Omit)

For the past four years, poor, typhoon-swept Okinawa had dangled at what bitter Army men call "the logistical end of the line," and some of its commanders have been lax and

inefficient. More than 15,000 U.S. troops, whose morale and discipline have probably been worse than that of any U.S. force in the world, have policed 600,000 natives who live in hopeless poverty. When a typhoon (dubbed "Gloria" by meteorologists) swept the island last summer and caused widespread damage, the Army finally investigated the situation. The island's command was shaken up. Major General William Eagles, a commander of ground forces, was replaced by breezy Major General Josef R. Sheetz, a convivial hustler who had done an able military government job in Korea. Air Force troops on Okinawa are commanded by grey, quiet-spoken Major General Alvin C. ("Ark-Ark") Kincaid, whose slightly absent-minded philosopher's air belies his hardheaded attention to discipline and morale. Since the change of command, Okinawa's scandalous decline has been arrested. But Sheetz and Kincaid still have a tough situation on their hands.

(Omit)

Sheetz and Kincaid are faced with other morale hazards. Recreational facilities consisted of a few broken-down movie shacks and football fields. Okinawa had become a dumping ground for Army misfits and rejects from more comfortable posts. In the six months ending last September, U.S. soldiers committed an appalling number of crimes 29 murders, 18 rape cases, 16 robberies, 33 assaults. (omitted or underlined by Yonaha)

The article closes with the following: "General Sheetz believes that the U.S. has far more than strategic interests on Okinawa: it carries, he says "the moral responsibility of a Christian people to others." On page 24 appears the photo of Major General Sheetz, the new Major General after the typhoon "Gloria."⁽⁵⁾ Gibney writes, "Major General William W. Eagles, commander of ground forces, was replaced by breezy Major General Josef R. Sheetz, a convivial hustler who had done an able militant job in Korea." Actually, it seems that the government by the new Major General Sheetz was better than the predecessor's. Ikemiyagi Syuui writes, "The ban on electric lights in Naha city was removed on 21st November and the food supply was announced to be increased by 50 %, citizens started to talk

about Major General Sheetz's good government." (Ikemiyagi,1970, p. 337.)

Warner (1995) also referred to Sheetz as one of the most respected Military Governors, saying that his personality and manner won over many Ryukyuan during his tenure as MG. Gibney writes, "Sheetz, Kincaid and their staff are facing up to that responsibility they are determined not to let Okinawa down." As Warner wrote, Sheetz was the most respected Military Governor and his governance was well evaluated by the Okinawan people. Despite his efforts, the presence of the U.S. military has kept Okinawa down nearly 70 years since then as it is described in the next chapter.

4. Causes of the chaotic situation

4-1. No policy and lax and inefficient commanders

Regarding what caused the chaotic situation, the reporter of the *Lodi News Sentinel* attributes it to the indecision of the United States in working out the details of its Far Eastern policy. Gibney attributes it to its lax and inefficient commanders.

As for the indecision of the United States in the policy toward Okinawa, Miyazato cited an American reporter's writing: "The US military stationed in Okinawa had no concrete objective in ruling Okinawa. It was just given a task to supervise war materials for attacking mainland Japan and Okinawan people who lost everything in the war." (Miyazato,1986,p.56) Miyazato blamed the broken chain of command during the time of the US Navy government from September 1945 to June 1946 by quoting the report of the Navy government that stated "because the supreme commander was the commander of Ryukyu, the commander of Navy in Ryukyu was the commander in Ryukyu since September 21 in 1945; however, the army commander of the region should be the chief of the military government in logic it was the commander of US army who was the chief of the military government since July 31st in 1945." This problem of the chain of command was resolved when the commander of Ryukyu was appointed as the commander of the US army in July 1946. However, I will not attribute only its unclear objective in ruling Okinawa to the disorder in the chain of command since it is obvious even after the unified command, the too short period of posting

and the too swift change were continued as can be seen in the list that Matuda provided. (Matuda,1998, P.30 ~ 31.) I believe the too short period of posting and the too swift change of the command is one of the reasons why the U.S. military government in Okinawa was inefficient. If the commander cannot be in the position enough long, he cannot exercise his idea and policy or his idea and policy may be changed soon by the next commander. Which will make the unstable situation in the society. Furthermore if a commander has any concrete idea or policy that he want to exercise for the betterment of Okinawa, he will stay in the position long enough to realize it. Such a short stay in the position shows partly that a commander does not have his own particular idea or policy or cannot have his own particular idea or policy. The list of the Major General of Ryukyus shows how quickly the turns occurred and how short each of them served.⁽⁶⁾

The reason why I will not attribute the lack of objective in ruling Okinawa to the disorder of the command is that there was no decrease in the number of crimes and accidents by US military personnel and in the chaotic situation of Okinawa even after unifying the chain of command, in other words, changing of the command from Navy to Army. On the contrary, the ruling of the army was evaluated worse than that of the Navy by the Okinawan people. Ikemiyagi writes that "It is said that Army is severe to Okinawan people and after the chief of the military government was changed from Navy to Army, many problems started to occur." (Ikemiyagi,1970, p.337)

Masayasu Ooshiro writes in the preface that during the Navy ruling, there were many liberal officers who used to be scholars in the important posts. The staff of Navy government were the people who well understood the culture and history of Okinawa and took the flexible posture to listen to the voice of the Okinawan people within the sphere of the occupation. (Okinawa Prefectural board of education,1986).

However, most of the staff of the Army were professional soldiers and the oppressive posture was remarkable. Matsuoka Seiho, a member of Shinjyunkai, is quoted as saying that "The Army was inferior to the Navy regarding the administrative ability. They were vulgar and aggressive." That reminded me of the writing of C.W. Mill's "Power

Elite,” in which he says that the staff of the Navy was recruited from the upper classes while the staff of the Army was recruited through a volunteer system. According to him, the officers of the Navy was shared by the people from Annapolis and they were gentlemen even in 1900. The author wonders if the Navy maintained such characteristics even in the time of the occupation of Okinawa.

Even though Major General Josef R. Sheetz (Army) was evaluated highly by the Okinawan people, his governing was also short because of his health problem. With this quick change of the commanders between the Army and the Navy and the very short term even after the unification with the Army, it is natural that the situation of Okinawa could not have been improved. I have the impression that Okinawa was trifled with various types of commanders as can be seen in the list of commander.

An officer in the US military lamented that Okinawa had become a dumping ground for Army misfits and rejects from more comfortable posts. (Gibney,1949) Ota refers that a former US officer commented that misfits and rejects in Tokyo had been sent to Phili-RyCom and those in Phili-RyCom were sent to U.S military government in Ryukyu. (Ota, 1984) Ikemiyagi (1970) also describes the problem of the low quality of officers in Okinawa:

Around that time Houun Tamayose (an old monk)⁽⁷⁾ visited Okinawa from Hawaii. He went to Hawaii from Okinawa when he was young and was working as a monk of Buddhism. . . . He paid a visit to Okinawa to see how devastated the Okinawan people were faring after the war. He said, “I heard in Hawaii that there are excellent military personnel who can count to ten with both hands in MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo, but, in Okinawa, the military men who can count only to five with one hand are stationed. I met some key officers in the military government and I found it was true.” He said it with a smile but he looked extremely disappointed. (translated by Yonaha) line5 ~ 17,in lower column, p. 305

The comment of Tamayose that “the military men who can count only to five with one hand” overlaps with what Gibney said of the US troops.

The fact that many officers were sent to

mainland Japan is also supported by the minutes of a liaison conference between the US military government and the representative members of Okinawa (members of Shijyun kai). (Okinawa Prefectural board of education,1986,p p.8~10) In the minutes of Sep. 10, 1945, an officer of the US military government said that there would be a drastic change in the number of officers staying in Okinawa; even though there had been 50 officers in each district so far, this would be decreased to two officers in each district. He explained the reasons as follows: (Okinawa Prefectural board of education, 1986, p.54)

1. because of the needs of officers in mainland Japan and Korea
2. because we realized that Okinawan people have enough qualification to govern themselves.
3. because we think it better to leave things to the members of the committee.

Here “the committee” seems to have meant “Shijyunkai” . As it said, there was a huge decrease in the number of officers, from 50 to two, which occurred at the end of 1945. Miyazato says that among the officers stationed in Okinawa, able men were sent to mainland Japan and the number reached 50% of all the officers in Okinawa. (Miyazato,1986,p.58) Therefore, if the officers who were sent to Korea are included, considering the decrease from 50 to 2 in each district in Okinawa, the author thinks it should be less than 5 % that remained in Okinawa.

4-2. Lack of morals of US troops shown in the crimes

Gibney points out that the morals and discipline of the U.S. troops were probably worse than that of any U.S. force in the world. The accidents and incidents from 1945 to 1952 show its chaotic situation during the period caused by the lack of morals of the US troops. There exist only a few materials on the crimes and accidents since everyone was just working hard to support his/her family after the battle of Okinawa, which killed 200,000 and devastated all the land of Okinawa at the time. According to Ikemiyagi (1970), neither the government or media had the power to record the incidents and accidents caused by the occupiers. There have been many accidents that have been buried in oblivion without ever

being recorded in history. Ikemiyagi, an Okinawan journalist at the time, writes about such situation:

There have been many crimes committed by American soldiers; however, such crimes and incidents which were unfavorable and disadvantageous to the U.S. military were beyond the reach of our hands. Rapes and the disappearance of women were not reported and no one complained to the police. What everyone could do was only watch the course of events. Just like that the war was a force majeure to the people, they endured an irresistible force under the U.S. military occupation just after the war. (pp.305)

(translated from Japanese to English by Yonaha)

The fact that even though there were numerous robberies and murders by U.S. personnel, there has not been a single murder case in which an American was killed by an Okinawan during the nearly 30 years of occupation and for the 40 years after the reversion to Japan also tells that Okinawans are generally quiet and peace-loving people. Ryukyu Shimpo (1992) also describes the situation as follows:

In the pre-war period in Okinawa, there was no one who stole things belonging to others even though people were eating only potatoes, so it was beyond their imagination to kill others. People saw many dead bodies during the war from Showa 20 to 22; however, their morals were still not spoiled. • • In such an environment, what scared the people were the US soldiers. About 1200 people moved to Naha in around Showa 22. In the village where tents were scattered, there hung oxygen cylinders here and there. They were there to warn all the villagers by striking them when American soldiers appeared to take women. As soon as an American soldier appeared, people stroke the cylinders, all the women hurried to hide and men gathered, leaving their work to protect the women. It was a scene that could be seen everywhere in Okinawa at the time because the rapes by American soldiers were rampant. (pp. 11)

(translated by Yonaha)

The author also read such an article in the *Okinawa Times* (2013/01/03) as a recollection of Nakamura Motonobu (75), a former principal of Futenme Daini elementary school. He writes:

Just after the end of the war, at the sound of someone hitting an oxygen cylinder, young men of the self-protection team gathered in the village at night. It was a warning signal to let us know that US military men had appeared to take women. Even though I was a child, I still remember how all the villagers tensed up. Such a thing happened almost every day at the time. (translated by Yonaha)

This was after the reversion to Japan when Okinawa recovered its autonomy and started to record the accidents caused by US military. However, the figures given by Gibney (29 murders, 18 rape cases, 16 robberies, 33 assaults in six months) can tell the situation of Okinawa around the time when the records were not taken by the Okinawan side. Like Ikemiyagi, the author believes that, especially in the case of rape, there must have been many incidents that were not reported.

However, even in such a situation, there are still some incidents that are recorded and one of them is an accident (*Okinawa Times*, Sep. 9, 2012) in which a reconnaissance plane called Dragonfly flew at an extremely low altitude and killed a 9-year-old boy by hitting his head with its wheel when he was playing on June 28, 1946. Another boy playing with him insisted that the pilot did it intentionally but this was never elucidated. If it was done intentionally, as the boy insisted, it should be called a crime, not an accident.

The damages caused by criminal activities and accidents of the U.S. military personnel before the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect varied from the loss of land and fishing rights to corporal damage and serious impairment of well-being. It has been reported that 315 people were killed and 760 people were injured by the illegal acts of U.S. military personnel. Since the U.S. military rejected the request for compensation, insisting the claim was waived by Article 19 in the Treaty, the Ryukyuan Government asked the Japanese Government to

solve this issue. It was October 1965 when the U.S. Congress passed the compensation bill of \$21.04 million dollars. The list of the incidents and accidents cited in Fukuchi Hiroaki (1995), "Crimes by US Military in Okinawa" is shown at the end of the paper. ⁽⁸⁾

As Fukuchi (1995) explains, "Accidents by US military personnel were rampant at the time and the number should be enormous. However, most of them were not recorded because from 1945 to 1951 investigations by police were rarely carried out. It was commonplace that neither arrest nor investigation of criminals, or compensation, were conducted. Deaths and injuries caused by US military vehicles were not included in cases at the time." Luckily, some were recorded and listed here by the author:

In the case of rape, the author can understand that it is hard for the victims to speak out. From the description in the sources written about the situation of the period just after the war, it is clear that rape was rampant. Rape should be much more than any other crimes; however, hardly anyone wants to record the cases. In the report of the US military government, "Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands 1945-1950," it is written that some soldiers injured local people as soon as they landed; there were especially many sexual offenses. In Nov. 1945, a policeman who ran after a US soldier who abducted an Okinawan woman was shot by the soldier.

Fukuchi walked around Okinawa getting people to submit applications to ask the Japanese government for compensation for the victims and damages done by the US military before the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The application reached 750 cases; however, he found that many victims had not made applications in order not to remember the horrible crimes and accidents like nightmares as well as for their honor and position. Especially in the case of rape, most victims did not come out to apply. He also said that some cases could not be investigated because witnesses of the crimes and accidents had already died or were not in the place where they used to live including the victims who were shot, raped to death, run over and killed. The application form was quite simple: first, applicant's name, legal domicile, present address; second, victim's name, address, birthday, the damage

or physical disability as the result of the crime or accident; third, the time and the date when the case occurred, the place, the person who inflicted damage and his belongings, the reason of the application and the brief content of the case described in 100 words; fourth, the amount of money applied for the treatment or compensation to a bereaved family; fifth, the name and the address of the witness; and, finally, the name and the birthday of the family of the deceased and their relation. Fukuchi asks with anger how they could describe the fact in which people were burned to death, beaten to death, stabbed to death -- all in 100 words. He says that in the bottom of the simple 100 words, there lies the deep grief and the severe suffering of the victims and the bereaved families.

4-3. Lack of discipline of U.S. military

The lack of discipline of the US military, it was shown by the number of crimes and accidents. Above all, the Iejima bomb explosion was most likely the biggest accident occurred in this period, which indicates such lack of discipline of the US military. Even though there were various accidents and crimes during the period of "chaotic situation," since the Iejima bomb explosion claimed huge number of victims and it is exactly the case caused by the lack of discipline as I found, I would like to take up this accident here. It occurred on Aug. 6th in 1948. In Iejima, when bomb disposal was being carried out, the U.S. military's ammunitions transport ship LCT 1141 exploded. There were 5,000 5-inch rocket shells (125 ton) that killed and injured many people at a wharf at the time. It was during the summer holidays, and there entered a local ferry boat and many people came to see the people. The explosion killed 107 people and injured 70 people, the largest accident in Okinawa under occupation. Why did it happen? The following is the report submitted to commanding General Ryukyus command, APO 331 by R.M.Levy Colonel, AGD Adjutant General on Sep. 10th in 1948. Regarding the Iejima explosion, it reported the following:

From the evidence presented, it appears that there were numerous violations of AR 55-470, that discipline was lax, and that proper command supervision was not being exercised. These factors do not appear to have been given

sufficient consideration by the board. A partial list of apparent violations of AR 55-470 follows:

The report cites the violations ① Gasoline was carried on the deck in violation ② the masters of the two LOTS engaged in this operation had not been informed of safety requirements and regulations ③ smoking was permitted on the LCT1141 while explosives were aboard and “no smoking” signs were not posted in violation ④ two soldiers carrying a stock pot of flour were aboard and scrambling across the piled rockets and they were not the personnel essential to the disposal operation ⑤ the piled rockets were not properly covered with paulins as required ⑥ the steel deck and bulkheads of LCT1141 were not sheathed with wooden dunnage as required

The paper also cites the lax discipline such as ① The fact above were allowed to exist ② Military personnel who were directed to specific duty stations for the leading operation were not on the stations ③ the rockets were loaded onto LCT1141 in a manner that was specified

Lack of adequate command supervision is also indicated by ① the officer issued orders for the leading of LCT1141 took no action to inquire that his orders were carried out ② no evidence that an officer of the 11th Air Ammunition Group was present during the operations ③ LCT 1141 was permitted to become fast aground during loading operations ④ The fact that even after efforts to float LCT 1141 had failed, loading operations were permitted to continue. The report says that as the Special Order # 189, Headquarters, Ryukyu Command, dated 13 August 1948, R.M LEVY Colonel, AGD be reconvened to further investigate this disaster with a view of fixing responsibility by Command of General Mac. Arthur. According to the investigation report, it is clearly determined that this disaster was caused by numerous violations of Army regulations, lack of supervision, and lax discipline.⁽⁹⁾

5. Okinawan people’s sentiment toward the U.S. military

How does such a situation caused by the US troops affect the sentiment of the Okinawan people toward America? Frank Gibney (1949) describes the Okinawan people’s feeling toward the American

military personnel at the end of the war:

Okinawans are an easy-going people whose hard life is mixed with simple pleasures like their village bullfights. They like the Americans, openly want their island to become a U.S. dependency. Long a subject people, they were exploited for more than 60 years by Japanese occupying troops and businessmen, who despised them as country cousins. When U.S. invaders gave them food and emergency shelter, Okinawans were amazed and grateful.

What Gibney said of Okinawan people’s sentiment toward American military was mostly true at the time. Okinawan people experienced the brutality of the Japanese army in the Battle of Okinawa. They had to run away from two enemies, American soldiers and Japanese soldiers who were said to be crueler than American soldiers. Some were forced to get away from the cave in which they were hiding and some babies were killed or suffocated when they cried, some were killed as spies when they spoke Okinawan dialects, and most of them were robbed their food by Japanese soldiers. What Okinawan people found was that the Japanese army was there not to protect the people. Syunichi Miyagi (1969) said in *Mainichi shinbun* (newspaper), Aug.15, 1969, that he heard from his parents that for a while after the war, Okinawan people hated the people of mainland Japan more than US soldiers since Japanese soldiers had treated Okinawan people so cruelly. Therefore, it can be well understood that Okinawan people were surprised and appreciated when American soldiers did not kill them and gave food and shelter, even medical treatment, when they had surrendered.

However, this friendly sentiment did not last long. It was the time when the U.S. occupation had just started and the people did not realize how it was going to be bitter and severe for them. Gibney already may have sensed that when he wrote the following:

Though it classified them as “a liberated people,” the U.S. has sometimes treated Okinawans less generously in occupation than the Japanese did. The battle of Okinawa completely wrecked the

islands' simple farming and fishing economy: In a matter of minutes the U.S. bulldozers smashed the terraced fields which Okinawans had painstakingly laid out for more than a century.

Ikemiyagi (1970) also writes about Gibney's comment on the Okinawan people, "They like the Americans and openly want their island to become a U.S. dependency."

In a few years after the war, surely there were many who wanted to belong to America from the bitter feeling against Japanese army and piled antipathy to Japanese officers since the Meiji era. If there was a referendum at the time, there was a high possibility that "American party" would have acquired the majority. However, "lax and inefficient Commanders" and "collapsed U.S. military discipline," as Gibney described, had lost the support of the Okinawan people as time went by. (Translated by Yonaha)

Ikemiyagi concludes that "lax and inefficient Commanders" and "collapsed US military discipline" have changed Okinawan people's sentiment toward US military from sympathy to antipathy.

6. Conclusion

As for the situation of Okinawa at the early stage of US occupation, it was found that the situation was chaos as read in the report of Gibney, the article of *Lodi News Sentinel*, the writing of Miyagi, and the incidents and accidents occurring at the time. Therefore, the research question "The situation of Okinawa from 1945 to 1952: how was its chaos?" was answered by the writing of the people above as well as the detailed lists of incidents and accidents. As the answer of the research question "The situation of Okinawa from 1945 to 1952: why was it caused?" , the historical background was described including the Emperor's message as an answer in a larger sense. As direct answers to the question, no policy and lax and inefficient commanders were cited as the causes of the chaos in the articles of *Lodi News Sentinel* and Gibney and they were confirmed by too many changes of the leaders and their short terms and other materials.

Another cause, the lack of discipline in the US military, was indicated especially by the report of the Iejima bomb accident and too many crimes by US military men. In the procedure to answer the question "Why and how was its chaos?" , the article of *Lodi News Sentinel*, which used the phrase "forgotten island" before Gibney and the US military report of Iejima accident as a cause of the chaos were cited for the first time in this paper.

When the situation of Okinawa under US occupation in the early stage of 1945 to 1952 is compared with the present situation of Okinawa after the reversion to Japan, the number of incidents and accidents is less and it may now not be a situation called chaos. The Okinawan people's sentiment toward the US military examined in the fifth section started with the movement of Okinawa's reversion to mainland Japan and Okinawa was finally reversed to Japan in 1972. However, the pains and sufferings due to the existence of the military are continuing as cited in the first section of the paper, and the people of Okinawa are still plagued with the problems caused by the presence of the US military base.

Notes:

- (1) Nimitz ordinance: Okinawan battle was fought by the Navy and Army that were controlled by the Supreme, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area : CINCPAC commodore C.W.Nimitz. (Chester William Nimitz)
- (2) Bruce Cumings (1981) says that President Roosevelt had been fighting with a group of unilateral monopolism in the military during the several months before his death. For example, in March 1945, when he found the military's plan to make the islands under the mandate of Japan "strategic territories," it is said that he lamented saying like "What on earth does the Navy think about the territory? Are they going to gain everything one after another?"
- (3) sacrificed stone strategy: "Teikoku RikuKaigun Sakusen Keikaku Taiko" (Outline of the Imperial Army Navy plan of operations) says the objective to fight for Okinawan war is the attrition of US military and secure the mainland Japan by losing its will of landing the mainland Japan. Its objective

clarifies that Okinawa was a sacrificed stone.

- (4) The content of the letter acquired at OPA (Okinawa Prefecture Archives) :
Tokyo, Sep. 22, 1947
Subject: Emperor of Japan's Opinion Concerning the Future of the Ryukyu Islands

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a self-explanatory memorandum for General MacArthur, September 20, 1947, containing the gist of a conversation with Mr. Hidenari Terasaki, an adviser to the Emperor, who called at this office at his own request.

It will be noted that the Emperor of Japan hopes that the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus, a hope which undoubtedly is largely based upon self-interest. The Emperor also envisages a continuation of United States military occupation of these islands through the medium of a long-term lease. In his opinion, the Japanese people would thereby be convinced that the United States has no ulterior motives and would welcome United States occupation for military purposes.

Respectfully yours,

W.J. Sebald
Counselor of Mission

Enclosure:

Copy of memorandum for General MacArthur, September 20, 1947.

Original to Department.

800

Wjsebald:lh

Enclosure to Dispatch No.1293 dated September 22, 1947 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Emperor of Japan's Opinion Concerning the Future of the Ryukyu Islands" :
Copy

General Headquarters

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
Diplomatic Section

20 September 1947

Memorandum for: General MacArthur

Mr. Hidenari Terasaki, an adviser to the Emperor, called by appointment for the purpose of conveying to me the Emperor's ideas concerning the future of Okinawa.

Mr. Terasaki stated that the Emperor hopes that the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus. In the Emperor's opinion, such occupation would benefit the United States and also provide protection for Japan. The Emperor feels that such a move would meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people who fear not only the menace of Russia, but after the Occupation has ended, the growth of rightist and leftist groups which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan.

The Emperor further feels that United States military occupation of Okinawa (and such other islands as may be required) should be based upon the fiction of a long-term lease---25 to 50 years or more---with sovereignty retained in Japan. According to the Emperor, this method of occupation would convince the Japanese people that the United States has no permanent designs on the Ryukyu Islands, and other nations, particularly Soviet Russia and China, would thereby be stopped from demanding similar rights.

As to procedure, Mr. Terasaki felt that the acquisition of "military base rights" (of Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus) should be by bilateral treaty between the United States and Japan rather than by part of the Allied peace treaty with Japan. The latter method, according to Mr. Terasaki, would savor too much of a dictated peace and might in the future endanger the sympathetic understanding of the Japanese people.

W. J. Sebald

- (5) The article of Uruma Shimpo (1949, Dec 2nd Friday) says, Sheetz commented on the article showing it to then Okinawan governor Shikiya by saying " This is the article which was written to excite American peoples' attention to the

island, once known as the site of a hard-fought battle, and now has been forgotten. Okinawa's reconstruction will start from now on." It says when the governor thanked him, he added. "It is rather late."

- (6) The list from Matuda (1998) *Sengo Okinawa no Keywords*. P.30 ~ 31.

Name (belonging)	period of position
Richmond K Turner (Navy)	March 26 th , 1945 ~
Simon B Vackner (Army)	April 26 th , 1945 ~
Roy S Geiger (Navy)	June 15 th , 1945 ~
Josef Dill Switel (Navy)	June 23 rd , 1945 ~
John Dill Price (Navy)	Sep., 25 th , 1945 ~
Lawrence J Lawson (Army)	Oct. 17 th , 1945 ~
Fremond B Hudson (Army)	Dec. 30 th , 1945 ~
Leo Donovan (Army)	Feb. 1946 ~
Frederic L Heidon (Army)	April/, 11 th , 1946 ~
Wilhelm D Styer (Army)	June 20 th , 1946 ~
Frederic L Heidon (Army)	July 1 st , 1946 ~
William E Eagles (Army)	May 11 th , 1948 ~
Harlie B Sherman (Army)	July 24 th , 1949 ~
Josef R Sheez (Army)	Oct. 1 st , 1949 ~
Robert B Maclure (Army)	July 29 th , 1950 ~
Harlie B Sherman (Army)	Dec. 6 th , 1950 ~
Robert S Beetra (Army)	Dec. 9 th , 1950 ~

- (7) Yamazato Katunori (2009) writes about Tamayose, born in Naha, Okinawa and went to Hawaii in 1920, as the person who negotiated with US military government on setting up the university of Ryukyus.p.93
- (8) The list of the crimes and accidents cited in Fukuchi Hiroaki (1995) "US military's crimes in Okinawa" (translated by Yonaha)

Crimes

1945, Aug. Ms. T (25) was sexually assaulted and killed by three black soldiers when she was picking vegetables.

1945, Aug. Ms. M (19) was raped by a white US soldier when she and her mother were walking. She gave birth to a girl of mixed race later.

1945, Sep. Ms. S (41) was raped by a white US soldier when she was mowing.

1945, Oct. Ms. O (35) was raped by two white US soldiers and gave birth to a boy of mixed race. Her husband returned from the war and took care of him as his own child.

1945, Sep. Mr. Kyan (26) was seriously wounded

when she was shot by a U.S. soldier when he was walking back to his home.

1945, Oct. Mr. Yoshizato (43) lost his right thumb by being shot by a US soldier when he was walking at the foot of Ishikawa dake (Mt. Ishikawa).

1945, Oct. Ms. China (18) was seriously wounded in a shooting by a US soldier when she was digging potatoes.

1945, Oct. Ms. Chinen and her two friends were walking when a US soldier shot them, killing her two friends and wounding her.

1945, Oct. Mr. Nakasone (35) was shot by black soldiers when he was walking back from his fishing. He became lame as the result of the injury.

1945, Nov. Mr. Sakihara, a police man was killed by black US soldiers when he tried to help two women who were raped.

1946, Jan. Ms. Zamami (65) was shot by a US soldier when she was walking and the wound made her lame.

1946, Feb. A boy whose name is Hanashiro was seriously wounded by a shot to the head by a US soldier when he was fetching water from a pond and as a result of the injury he became mute.

1946, May. Ms. Miyazato (46) was wounded when she was shot by a US. soldier as she was digging potatoes.

1946, June. Mr. Kohama (36) was shot by a US soldier when he was walking.

1946, July. Mr. Matayoshi (26) was shot and injured when he helped his wife when four Philippino US soldiers tried to abduct her.

1946, July. Mr. Hokama was shot by three black soldiers while he was running away with his wife when they tried to abduct her.

1946, Sep. Ms. Kouki was shot by a US soldier without any reason when she was walking home.

1946, Dec. Mr. Yafuso was shot by a few black soldiers when he heard a woman's cry and tried to help her.

1946, Dec. A boy (15) was seriously wounded by a gunshot when he tried to help Ms. K., his neighbor, who was about to be raped by several black soldiers.

1947, May. Mr. H was a policeman who tried to help three white US soldiers when their car was

stuck in mud; however, he was knocked down, hit, and trampled upon.

1947, Sep. Mr. Sunagawa was shot by a US soldier without any reason when he was walking back to his hometown.

1947, Sep. Ms. Sumi was seriously wounded by a shot from two black soldiers when she tried to help her daughter who was nearly abducted by them.

1948, Aug. Ms. Syukumine (22) was seriously wounded by a shot from a US soldier when she was digging potatoes.

1948, Dec. Mr. Gushiken (19) was shot and killed by two white US soldiers when he helped a woman who was about to be raped by them.

1949, Ms. Kuniyoshi (45) was shot and seriously wounded by a US soldier when she was collecting the wood that had been thrown out to sea by a typhoon.

1949, July. Mr. Nakachi (24) and his friends were wounded in a fight with the same Philippino soldiers when they tried to help Ms. T, who was raped by these soldiers. They killed Mr. Shinzato (40) before they abducted her.

1949, Aug. Mr. Nakasone (21) was wounded by a shot from a US soldier when he tried to hold back the soldier who was drunk and acted violently.

1950, Nov. Mr. Gakiya was shot and seriously wounded by a US soldier when he was walking back to his home.

Accidents

1945, April. Ms. Gibo (26) in Iejima was seriously wounded by a land mine when she was mowing by the order of the US military.

1945, August. Ms. Nakasone (25) in Nago was seriously injured by a bomb explosion.

1945, August. A boy (9) in Nago was killed by a land mine left when he was playing.

1945, August. Mr. Syukumine (51) was killed instantly by an explosion of a dud mine.

1945, Sep. A boy (13) of Mr. Fujita was seriously injured when he was gathering shellfish. This occurred when US soldiers shot at a mine on the beach.

1945, Oct. Ms. Toma (45) lost both her eyes from an explosion of dynamite which was laid down

by the US military to expand the road.

1945, Oct. A boy (14) of Mr. Naka in Iejima was wounded by a land mine laid by US military.

1945, Nov. A boy (12), a child of Takara in Nakijin, was killed by an explosion of an unexploded bomb.

1945, Nov. Ms. Gushiken (64) and Ms Ogido (73) were burnt to death when a US jet fighter crashed near their houses.

1946, Feb. A boy (4), a child of Mr. Uema in Yonashiro, was killed with two other boys by shell fragments from a small missile shot by US soldiers.

1946, March. Mr. Henzan (16) in Iejima lost eyesight in his left eye from an explosion in a bonfire.

1946, March. Mr. Maeda (54) in Nakijin was killed by an explosion from a US hand grenade when he was cleaning the ditch by a well.

1946, May. Ms. Tanahara in Urasoe was hit in the head and killed by a huge stone from an explosion of bomb disposal of the US military.

1946, July. Mr. Ooganeku (62) in Nago was killed instantly by a land mine laid by the US military.

1946, August. Mr. Taba (30) was killed by an explosion of a land mine when he and others were grading. Seven Okinawans and two US soldiers were killed in this accident in Urasoe.

1946, Nov. A boy (7) of Mr. Nakasone in Oozato was killed by an explosion of a dud when he was playing.

1947, Jan. Mr. Yafuso (19) was killed by an explosion of a bomb when he was unloading it. The US military did not teach him how to deal with bombs nor take any preventative measures to prevent the accident.

1947, Feb. Mr. Iha (20) in Naha was killed by an explosion of a dud mine when he was plowing.

1947, April. Mr. Miyagi (31) in Ginowan was killed by an explosion of a dud while plowing.

1947, March. A bomb explosion at Mawashi Elementary School killed at least seven teachers and children and forty were injured. It used to be a US ammunition dump.

1947, Nov. Mr. Nishie died and all eight family members except his daughter died one after another. Mr. Matumot's family also became ill

after they moved near Mr. Nishie's place. It was found later that the well which supplied drinking water was polluted by arsenic dumped into the well by the US military. At the time, arsenic was used to deal with dead bodies in the US military.

1947, Dec. A boy (15) of Mr. Tamaki was seriously wounded by an explosion of a dud mine.

1948, June. Mr. Ahagon in Iejima was killed by touching a bomb in the ground when he was plowing the field. The area was the US military army camp but the ammunition had not been disposed.

1948, Sep. Bomb explosion on the LCT killed 107 people and injured 70 people in Iejima.

1949, April. A boy (9) and girl (8), the children of Mr. Tamaki, were killed instantly by a bomb in the ground when they were plowing. It used to be a US ammunition dump but the US military cleared the place and permitted villagers to plow.

1950, August. A resident in Yomitan village was killed by an external fuel tank which fell off a US jet fighter. (Wikipedia)

1951, Oct. Six people (Mr. Ueze and Ms Uezu, her son, 3, and daughter, 1,) were burnt to death by a crash of a US jet fighter onto his house. US jet fighters were flying over the densely populated area even though they had their own air route.

Accidents

1945, Sep. Mr. Shimabukuro who was on a truck driven violently by a white US soldier was thrown out of the truck and seriously wounded when the car overturned at a curve. He died from the injury in 1960.

1945, Sep. A girl, Sumiko Azama (11) was killed by hit and run by a jeep of three US soldiers. Even though the jeep hit two children and her, it did not stop them from running to the white beach.

1945, Dec. Mr. Nakaima (70), who was on a US military truck to help a stranded LST (landing ship tank) was thrown out of the truck, hit his head and died 10 days later.

1945, Sep. Ms. Taira (39) was forced into a jeep in which four white soldiers were in when she was picking yomogi (young leaves of mugworts). When the jeep hit the curb, she was

thrown out and her baby on her back was killed and she was seriously wounded.

1945, Nov. Mr. Tuha, who was eight at the time, was a victim of hit and run by a jeep driven by a white US soldier. Because of the injury to his head, he often faints and cannot work even after he has grown up.

1946, Jan. Mr. Higa, who was in a GMC truck, was killed instantly when a drunken US soldier driver was not able to avoid the curb and fell down the hill. That night, the GMC truck came to Mr. Higa's house and brought a package of his bloody remains. At the sight of this, his younger brother became mentally ill from the shock. Mr. Hengan, who was seriously wounded, also died at the hospital.

1946, August. Ms. Nagamine (74) was run over by a US military truck and became lame. She died from the injury in 1956.

1947, July. Mr. Shimada (56) was hit by a military truck driven by a white soldier. Due to the nature of the injury to his head, he became mentally disabled and cannot work.

1951, August. Mr. Uechi was thrown out of a military truck when he was working on a base. He was seriously wounded and he is still in the hospital even after 20 years. He was divorced because his condition was getting worse.

Misbehavior

1946, Specific date is unknown. Two people, including Ms Ookawa (31) in Gushikawa, were killed and six people were seriously injured when two white US soldiers came in the yard and ran away after they made a boy hold a hand grenade. Ms Ookawa shouted "it's gonna explode! Run away!" He threw it but it was too late.

1946, April. Mr. Koki and Mr. Kojya in Gushikawa were stopped by seven black US soldiers on the way back from farming. They told them to pose for the picture and when they did, one of the soldiers suddenly hit them with a log. Two of them had multiple injuries to the bodies.

1946, June. Mr. Mekarū (18) in Oozato was cut with an electric saw operated by a US soldier and died. The soldier said it was an operational error.

1946, Nov. Mr. Uehara, in Yonabaru, a high

school boy, was hit in his left eye with an empty bottle thrown by a US soldier and lost his eyesight.

1947, April. A boy, Takenori, in Gushikawa was seriously wounded by having a stone thrown at his face from a GMC truck.

1947, Sep. Mr. Chinen (16) in Oozato was working at the AJ motor pool on the base and that night he was on night duty. A US soldier broke an electric bulb for fun which resulted in a large fire and Mr. Chinen was burned to death.

1948, Jan. Ms. Nakazato (18) in Motobu was run over and killed when a US truck drove too close to her. It was clear that it was intentional from the tracks of the tires.

1948, March. Ms. Yamashiro (23) in Onna was run over by a military truck by white soldiers whilst she was walking. A soldier tried to fetch her headscarf and she fell down and got run over.

1949, Feb. A son (5) of Mr. Kawamitu in Miyako was hit in the eye by a shot of a US soldier's fowling piece.

1949, March. Mr. Nakamoto in Nakijin was selling ice cakes when white US soldiers came to ask for women. When he answered "There is no women here" in gesture, they hit him and trampled him down until he became unconscious. He was not able to work for a few years and still suffers from the injury.

1949, July. Mr. Nagahama (29) in Koza was electrocuted when a US soldier threw a switch when he was working on wiring.

1950, Dec. Mr. Kyuuna (42) was killed by hitting his head when he was held by a bulldozer operated by a US soldier for fun and thrown down to the ground. This was done when he was taking a nap on the grass.

1951, Dec. Mr. Tokashiki in Nago was pushed off a rock by a US soldier when he was fishing at night. He has difficulty in walking.

1951, Dec. Mr. Shimabukuro, an elementary school boy at the time, touched the US military's high-voltage power line, which was just left without any caution, and lost his hand and became lame. Rape

Around 1945 ~ 46 Ms. M was raped by three white US soldiers when she was digging potatoes

and gave birth to a child of mixed race. After birth, she was in bed for a long time because of a mental shock and died four years later leaving three children.

1946, March. Ms. T (30) was raped by three US soldiers and seriously wounded. After that, she became unable to give birth and cannot work from the injury.

1949, Dec. Ms. A (19) was raped by a black US soldier and later on she gave birth to a child of a mixed race after she married an Okinawan man. He took care of the child as if it was his own.

(9) The report submitted to commanding General Ryukyus command, APO 331 by R.M. Levy Colonel, AGD Adjutant General on Sep. 10th in 1948.

a. The testimony of major Monighetti, Mr. Waseett and Capt. Harkeloroad indicates that gasoline was carried on the deck in violation of ports 2h and 20b, AR 55-470.

b. The testimony of Francisco Calbo, crew member of LCT 1141, and Julio Evangelista, Master of LCT 1123, as given to CIC investigators, indicates that the masters of the two LCTs engaged in this operation had not been informed of safety requirements and regulations as required by par 4, AR 55-470.

c. The testimony of Francisco Calbo and Cpl Earl French, as given to CIC investigators, indicates that smoking was permitted on the LCT 1141 while explosives were aboard, and that "no smoking" signs were not posted at the loading site, in violation of par, 15 55-470.

d. There is no evidence that the special flags and lights required by par 10, AR 55-470, were displayed.

e. There is evidence that the strict control of personnel required by par 16, AR 55-470, was not enforced, in that two soldiers carrying a stock pot of flour were aboard the LCT and scrambling across the piled rockets before they were noticed by any member of the crew; and that personnel not essential to the disposal operation were aboard the craft.

f. It is not clear whether the piled rockets were properly covered with paulins as required by

par 29b, AR 55-470. It is inferred that they were not; otherwise, Gonso Chinen could not have seen the piled rockets start to fall when the two soldiers ran across the piled rockets. (see page 6, CIC report)

- g. The testimony of Mr. Thune indicates that the steel deck and bulkheads of LCT 1141 were not sheathed with wooden dunnage as required by par 22, AR 55-470.

Lax discipline is indicated by:

- a. The fact that items 2a to 2g above were allowed to exist.
- b. The fact that Mr. Hartke and Mr. Wescott were directed by Lt Crowder to specific duty stations for the leading operations of 6 August, but agreed between themselves to perform duties at stations other than the stations to which they were specifically assigned. (See statements of Lt Crowder and Mr. Wescott in the CIC report.)
- c. The fact that the rockets were loaded onto LCT 1141 in a manner other than that which Lt Crowder had specified.

Lack of adequate command supervision is indicated by

- a. The fact that Lt. Crowder issued orders for the leading of LCT 1141, but took no action to inquire that his orders were carried out.
- b. Lack of evidence that an officer of the 11th Air Ammunition Group was present on Iejima during the loading operations on 6 August.
- c. The fact that LCT 1141 was permitted to become fast aground during loading operations were permitted to continue.

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